Master morals, an Essay

13 03 2011
An Informal Defense of Master Morality, Part Three: Defense and Concluding Thoughts

Finally, the fundamental principle of master morality is this: “we have duties only towards our peers, and that we may treat those of lower rank, anything foreign, as we think best.”

Anyone who objects to master morality can go suck my existentialist dick.

There can be several objections to master morality, of which I will take two into consideration.

Firstly, a critic of master morality may object to the lack of respect towards humanity evidenced. I say that because we may “treat those of lower rank … as we think best” the level of morality of the particular treatment of any individual and indeed their status as one of a lower rank falls to the one who deemed it to be so—the is up the noble individual, and only they may submit their actions for moral evaluation. Although proponents of the categorical imperative may disagree, master morality does not have to be intrinsically “wrong.”

In order to introduce the second objection to master morality, which has much to do with the “slave’s” perspective, I must first invoke a particular quote from Nietzsche: “the slave’s eye does not readily apprehend the virtues of the powerful … he is keenly distrustful of everything the powerful revere as “good”—he would like to convince himself that even their happiness is not genuine.” We can imagine for the purpose of this argument a critic that looks at the master morality, and says that the noble must lead empty, bitter lives without integrity. Our immediate, yet less satisfying response is quite obvious: is the condition of the slave truly any better? As far as I am concerned, without having experienced the position of a master, the critic in favor of slave morality is not a competent judge of the worth of master morality. In this, our response has much in common with that of the principle of utility to the swine objection*. The other response is far more satisfying on the grounds of egoism, though harder to argue in terms of morality: it is possible that one, as a master, may find as much pleasure in one’s power as can be conceivably derived from living a life of “integrity” not solely because power is not always held at the exclusion of integrity but also because power itself can be a means to pleasure.

Also, legit conclusions are for legit schoolwork, full stop


*The swine objection to the principle of utility: a thing I don’t feel like explaining to you.




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